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Although economic decision-making is commonly characterized as a purely rational
phenomenon, it is clear that real-world decision-making is influenced by emotions.
Yet, relatively little is known about the neural correlates of this process. To explore
this issue, 20 participants underwent fMRI scanning while engaged in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game under partner-directed sympathy, anger and neutral emotion conditions.
Participants were most and least likely to cooperate after sympathy and anger
induction, respectively, with the neutral condition eliciting intermediate cooperation
rates. Moreover, the sympathy condition elicited quicker responses for cooperation
than defection choices, whereas this pattern was reversed in the anger and neutral
conditions. Left amygdala activation showed a positive correlation with cooperation
rates and self-reports of partner directed sympathy in the sympathy condition. In the
anger condition, left putamen activation was positively correlated with cooperation rates
and negatively correlated with self-reports of partner directed anger strength. These
findings indicate that while the left amygdala activation may be indicative of emotion
enhancement and increase of cooperative behavior, the left putamen may help to
suppress an emotion to overcome anger and engage in cooperation.
Keywords: prisoner’s dilemma, sympathy, anger, amygdala, putamen, cooperation, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Human choice often involves tension between cooperation and non-cooperation. Actions to
combat climate change provide a relevant real-world example. As a society we and our children
would be much better oﬀ if we all cooperated in reducing carbon emissions (and jointly bear the
costs). However, as an individual, if I bear the cost and reduce my carbon footprint (cooperate), and
my neighbor continues to pollute (defect), he will reap a greater beneﬁt than myself. If, however, I
choose to continue polluting (defect), and my neighbor bears the cost of reducing carbon emissions
(cooperate), I will reap the greatest beneﬁt. If we both choose to continue polluting (defecting), we
will both suﬀer equally. These types of choices are often formulated and studied in the laboratory
as variations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Oskamp and Perlman, 1965).
For much of the 20th century, the dominant view of humans, embodied in the “homo
economicus” model was as a utility maximiser as a consumer, and a proﬁt maximiser as a producer.
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On this model, decision-makers will exhibit perfect self-
interested rationality and select the choice most advantageous
for them. What makes such game theoretic tasks interesting
is that the advantageous choice is dependent upon predicting
the choice made by your opponent. Economic theory argues
that defecting or not cooperating with your partner in the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be consistent with utility
maximizing behavior (Neyman, 1985). Data on such tasks show
that participants will typically cooperate 40% of the time, while
defecting approximately 60% of the time (Jones et al., 1968;
Bó and Fréchette, 2011).
The “homo economicus” model is slowly changing as
we begin to accept and accommodate the reality that
various factors including emotions (Goel and Dolan, 2003;
Goel and Vartanian, 2011; Halperin et al., 2013; Smith
et al., 2014, 2015; Goel et al., 2017; Levine et al., 2017;
Eimontaite et al., 2018), reward processing (Sanfey et al.,
2003), Theory of Mind (Camerer, 2003) and individual
diﬀerences in cognitive inhibition (De Neys et al., 2011),
social orientation (Emonds et al., 2014), and trust (Chaudhuri
et al., 2002; Lambert et al., 2017) modulate our decision-
making. In fact, trust and cooperation are hard to separate
and quite often these terms are used interchangeably while
investigating social interaction games (Yamagishi et al., 2005).
However, the attempts to separate cooperation and trust
show that cooperation leads to trust (Chaudhuri et al., 2002;
Yamagishi et al., 2005). Our focus here is on the eﬀect of
emotions on rational choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
and development of cooperation as predecessor of trust in
social interactions.
Common sense tells us that emotions should drive
decisions by modulating subjective experiences (Scherer,
1982, 2005). Behavioral data, unsurprisingly, indicate that
sympathy can encourage higher cooperation levels, even if it is
costly/detrimental to the decision-maker (Bloom, 2017). Anger
can trigger higher defection rates, again, even at a cost to the
decision-maker (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar
et al., 2004; Duersch and Servátka, 2007). In a study by Kopelman
et al. (2006), participants in the role of sellers made higher
demands while interacting with buyers displaying negative
emotions by asking higher prices, and provided shorter warranty
periods, etc. Buyers were less likely to sign a deal in the negative
emotion condition compared to positive and neutral emotion
conditions (Kopelman et al., 2006). The same pattern of behavior
is observed in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with anger and
sympathy emotions felt toward the other: sympathy toward
the opponent increases cooperation, while anger toward the
opponent increases defection compared to the neutral condition
(Eimontaite et al., 2013). On the other hand, it is not only the
valence of the emotion which needs to be considered, but also the
motivation which is triggered by induced emotion. Engelmann
and Hare (2018) review studies where withdrawal-related
emotional states, such as sadness, fear and empathy, lead toward
risk averse choices, while approach-related emotions, such as
anger, lead to more risky decisions. These results, as Engelmann
and Hare (2018) note, are also reﬂected in the neuroimaging
study ﬁndings: choices under safety show activation in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, but not
the insula. Yet, insula activation is evident under conditions of
sadness and the perception of fairness.
Although emotions are important in decision-making, they
are not the only factors determining the choice one will make.
The perception of the possible rewards/gains or losses also aﬀect
decision-making processes (McCabe et al., 2001; Sanfey et al.,
2003; King-Casas, 2005). Reward processing in the brain is
marked by striatum activation (including putamen and caudate)
and in economic games has shown an increase in activation
associated with winnings (Elliott et al., 2003; Haruno, 2005; Hsu
et al., 2008), and the decrease in activation with losses (Verney
et al., 2003; Bjork, 2004).
Strategic thinking is also an important factor in decision-
making and seems to be represented by medial prefrontal
cortex activation (Blair et al., 1999; Frith, 2001; McCabe et al.,
2001; Decety et al., 2004). High co-operators in the Trust
Game showed stronger medial prefrontal cortex activation whilst
interacting with human opponents as opposed to interacting with
a computer. Yet for high defectors, activation of this region did
not depend on the type of the opponent – human or computer
(McCabe et al., 2001). Furthermore, deciding to trust individuals
from the same racial group or not involved the striatum and
amygdala (Stanley et al., 2012). In particular, striatum activation
was recorded during representation of race-based reputations
that shape trust decisions, while the amygdala was involved
in processing emotionally relevant social group information.
The amygdala is also critical for forming trust: patients with
lesions to the amygdala tended to increase trust in response to
betrayals in the Trust Game, while neurologically normal adults
and patient controls show a decrease in trust after betrayals
(Koscik and Tranel, 2011).
Tasks like the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be presented either
as single shot trials or multiple trials involving extended social
interaction. The latter, iterated version of the task, presents
the outcome of the interaction after each trial. This introduces
complexity in terms of social context and reputation building,
requiring additional strategizing (Camerer, 2003; Cuesta et al.,
2015; Levine et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017). Reputation building
involves monitoring the choices of your opponent in the context
of your choices. If you cooperate on a particular trial, but your
opponent chooses to defect, this will aﬀect your decision on
subsequent trials. But it will also have an emotional impact
in terms of making you angry, upset, disappointed, or feeling
cheated. In such a case, it is not clear how one would separate
the eﬀects of reputation building from emotions. Separating the
inﬂuences of the emotional state of the decision-maker from
strategic thinking in decision-making processes would allow
further understanding of how various social inﬂuences shape
decision-making. Separating the inﬂuences of emotional states of
the decision-maker from strategic thinking in decision-making
processes would allow further understanding of how various
social inﬂuences shape decision-making. Some research has used
iterated single shot games with unknown opponents to avoid
reputation building eﬀects (Ramsøy et al., 2015; Macoveanu et al.,
2016), and this paradigm allows to investigate decision-making
without prior emotion induction. However, adding emotion
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induction unrelated to the interaction in the game would be
complicated in the context of iterated single shot games and
diﬃcult for the participant to keep track of.
The goal of the present study was to identify brain regions
associated with decision-making in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
under the inﬂuence of three partner-directed emotion conditions:
sympathy, anger, and neutral. Several previous neuroimaging
studies have explored the eﬀect of emotions on decision-making
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In a study by Singer et al.
(2004) participants and their opponents (who were not real)
had to interact on a Prisoner’s Dilemma type game. They had
two conditions – make decisions by themselves (intentional)
or follow predetermined decision by a computer. After the
interaction, participants were asked to evaluate the other players
and the results revealed sympathetic responses with cooperative
opponents, and anger toward defecting opponents when these
decisions were intentional (participants decided by themselves
and were not determined by computer). In a follow-up study,
after interaction in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants
had to observe pain induction to cooperative opponents and
this increased their anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex
activation (Singer et al., 2006). However, during the same pain
induction to the unfair opponent, male participants showed
increased activity in nucleus accumbens.
Rilling et al. (2008) looked at the interaction between
reciprocated and unreciprocated cooperation in the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In particular, opponent’s defection
after participants cooperation showed greater activation
in bilateral anterior insula, left hippocampus and left
amygdala, while bilateral ventral striatum showed deactivation.
Furthermore, unreciprocated cooperation after previous
cooperation compared to defection showed increased activity in
anterior insula and left hippocampus. These results indicate that
these areas are responsive to unreciprocated cooperation and
anger emotion as reported by participants in a post-experiment
questionnaire. Although these studies provide some insight
into how emotions aﬀect decision-making in socio-economic
games, the emotion is triggered by the game play and it is hard
to disengage whether emotions were driving the decision or they
were incidental to the outcomes.
Our study diﬀers from previous eﬀorts in three respects.
First, we avoided the potential confound of reputation building
by keeping participants blind to the outcome of each trial
in addition to avoiding one shot games. Second, participants’
knowledge of the other player was built by emotion induction
prior to the interaction in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. That
is, emotions were triggered by an event that was incidental to
the decision situation, but the emotion was decision-relevant as
it was triggered by and directed toward their opponent in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Finally, we compared the eﬀect of
two distinct emotions, sympathy and anger, in a within-subject
design, allowing us to investigate cooperation and defection
choices while controlling for individual diﬀerences. We predicted
participants would show more cooperation in the sympathy
condition compared to the neutral condition, andmore defection
in the anger compared to the neutral condition (Eimontaite et al.,
2013). At the neural level we were interested in the interaction
between emotion and choice and expected activation in the brain
areas previously identiﬁed to be involved in emotional stimuli
processing, processing of trustworthiness and decision-making.
In particular, we predicted amygdala activation during processes
where participants would embrace emotions and emotionally
relevant information about individuals (Koscik and Tranel, 2011;
Stanley et al., 2012), and striatum, and in particular putamen,
activation for overcoming emotion eﬀects (Padmala and Pessoa,
2010; Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019). That is, increased
cooperation in sympathy condition would result in activation
in the amygdala, while decreased defection in anger condition
would show putamen involvement.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two Italian health care professionals employed at
the IRCCS San Camillo Hospital Foundation (Venice, Italy)
voluntarily took part in the study. Two participants were removed
due to awareness of the deception and extensive head movement
in the scanner, leaving 20 participants (6 males, 14 females) in
the ﬁnal analysis. Mean age of the participants was 29 years
(SD = 5.68), and mean education was 16.4 years (SD = 3.54).
Participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, 18 were
right-handed. The study was approved by the University of Hull
(United Kingdom) and the IRCCS San Camillo (Italy) ethics
committees. Each participant provided written informed consent.
Task
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game simulated a hypothetical situation
whereby you and a partner are bankers suspected in corporate
malfeasance. The police interrogate both of you separately, and
oﬀer each of you the following deal: If you provide the missing
facts to the police (i.e., defect on your partner), and your partner
stays silent, you will get a reward of €50,000 and your partner
will pay a ﬁne of €50,000. If both of you confess (defect on each
other) and ﬁll in the facts for the police, you will both pay a
ﬁne of €10,000. If you choose to stay silent (cooperate with your
partner), and your partner ﬁlls in the facts for the police (defects),
he/she will receive a reward of €50,000 and you will pay a ﬁne of
€50,000. If both of you choose to stay silent (cooperate), the police
will not have enough evidence to convict either of you and will be
forced to pay you €30,000 each for wrongful arrest. The payoﬀ
matrix is presented in Figure 1. The payoﬀs are a function of,
not only the participant’s selection, but also the selection of their
partner. The task requires participants to make decisions that
will maximize their hypothetical gains andminimize hypothetical
losses. Each participant plays the game with three diﬀerent
partners, under three diﬀerent emotion conditions.
Emotion Inducement
Steps were also taken to make participants feel anger or sympathy
toward two of the three partners and remain neutral toward
the third partner prior to the commencement of the game via
an essay writing and evaluation task. Participants were asked to
write a short essay describing something important to them. The
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FIGURE 1 | A single trial of the Prisoner’s Dilemma would start with a fixation cross (1.5 s), followed by a reminder of the other “participant’s” essay and evaluation
(each for 4 s). In the end the participant would make a choice (up to 7 s) on the Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome table by pressing either the Index finger (cooperation) or
the Middle finger (defection).
experimenter would take the essay out of the room, explaining
that it would be given to their “partner” for comments/evaluation
and that they would be required to evaluate the partner’s essays.
Approximately 5 min later the experimenter would return with
one of the “partner’s” essays for evaluation. After the evaluation
was completed, the experimenter would take the evaluation and
leave the room to retrieve the participant’s essay evaluated by
their “partner” (Eimontaite et al., 2013).
In actuality, the participant was being deceived. There
were no other participants. The experimenter would return
with the participant’s essay, purportedly evaluated by their
“partner.” These evaluations consisted of the ratings of the
essays on six 9-point bipolar scales (unintelligent–intelligent;
thought provoking–boring; friendly–unfriendly; illogical–logical;
respectable–unrespectable; irrational–rational), along with a
space for free comments. In the sympathy condition the emotion
was induced with an essay written by a young person coping
with cancer [modiﬁed from Harmon-Jones et al. (2003)]. In
this condition the evaluation of the participant’s essay was rated
neutrally (between 4 and 7 on the evaluation scales) and a
hand-written positive comment “I can understand why a person
would think like this” was left underneath the evaluation. In the
anger condition, emotion was mainly triggered by the negative
evaluation consisting of ratings that were weighted toward
negative words (e.g., illogical or unacceptable). An insulting
comment was also hand-written underneath the evaluation
(“This is the stupidest thing I have ever read”). The essay in
this condition was neutral in content, but a poorly written
(grammatical mistakes, badly structured arguments). Finally,
neutral emotion induction consisted of a neutral content essay,
written in an unemotional and grammatically correct way,
followed by a neutral (evaluations between 4 and 6) evaluation
of the participant’s own essay with no hand-written comments.
The procedure was repeated three times (once per each
emotion condition) and photographs of both the opponent’s
essays and the evaluations of the participant’s own essay
were taken to strengthen the deception (all photographs were
prefabricated before the experiment). These photographs of
essay and evaluation were later presented before each Prisoner’s
Dilemma trial so that participants would know with whom
they were interacting. Following emotion induction, participants
previewed the uploaded photographs of their “partner’s” essays
and the evaluations they received on their own essays, to
familiarize them with the digital versions.
The essays and evaluations were hand-written on diﬀerent
color paper (light blue, light purple, and light green) so that
participants would learn to associate a color with a particular
“partner.” Colors associated with particular conditions hence the
conditions were counterbalanced across participants.
The Task Presentation
An iterated 108-trial version (36 per emotion condition) of the
game was used in the experiment. Each individual trial of the
game would start with a ﬁxation cross remaining on screen for
1.5 s on average followed by the scanned essay and the evaluation
from the emotion induction 4 s each, both color-coded to provide
content cues; serving as a rumination helping to prolong the
emotion duration (Sbarra and Emery, 2005; Verduyn et al., 2009).
Finally, the payoﬀ matrix was presented for 7 s during which
participants had to choose between cooperation and defection. If
the participant made their decision in less than 7 s, the remaining
time was added to the inter trial interval (ITI).
The order of the emotion conditions was pseudo-randomized,
allowing a maximum of three consequent trials of the same
emotion condition. Six diﬀerent payoﬀ matrices were
presented and the amount possible to gain and lose in each
had the same proportions (3: 5: −5: −1; i.e., participant
cooperates/other cooperates: +€30,000/+€30,000; participant
cooperates/other defects: +€50,000/−€50,000; participant
defects/other cooperates: −€50,000/+€50,000; participant
defects/other defects: −€10,000/−€10,000; Figure 1). Three
pre-determined outcomes of the interaction (“You get €315,500
out of overall €730,000 possible earnings,” “You get €396,000 out
of overall €849,000 possible earnings,” or “You get €745,000 out
of overall €900,000 possible earnings”) were counterbalanced
between three runs. These outcomes were presented only after
36 trials to avoid a reputation eﬀect, and were independent
of the participants’ responses (Figure 1). Participants were
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not provided information about the opponent earnings. The
dependent measure was the mean number of defection and
cooperation per emotion condition.
In addition to the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
participants completed a self-report emotion questionnaire
to evaluate the success of emotion induction [adapted from
Harmon-Jones et al. (2003), and Harmon-Jones and Sigelman
(2001)]. Words being semantically related to sympathy,
compassion, and sadness were pooled into a sympathy word
group (Cronbach’s Alpha 0.914, n = 17). Similarly, words
indicative of anger and fear emotions were combined to an anger
emotion word list (Cronbach’s Alpha 0.875, n = 17), and the
neutral emotion word list contained adjectives associated with
positive aﬀect (Cronbach’s Alpha 0.834, n = 18). Further, a mixed
ANOVA conﬁrmed that each emotion was successfully induced
as planned: in the sympathy condition, the sympathy word group
was rated highest as well as the anger word group in the anger
emotion condition (Supplementary Materials).
Procedure
Before signing informed consent and agreeing to take part in the
study, participants were informed that the purpose of the study is
to investigate various reasoning processes. They were told that
they will need to interact with other individuals in this study
on some of the tasks, however, other tasks will be completed
just on their own. After this, participants took part in the
essay writing/emotion induction task. After emotion induction,
participants were taken to the fMRI room, where they were
reminded of the rules of the Prisoner’s Dilemma before playing
it. The experiment consisted of three runs with 36 trials per run
(12 trials of sympathy, 12 of anger, and 12 of neutral emotion
condition). Each run lasted for 11.5 min. Participants did not
receive the reimbursement depending on their performance in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. After the scanning procedure,
participants ﬁlled in the Self-Report Emotion Questionnaire.
Finally, questions establishing the participant’s belief in the
deception were asked and the full debrief was given providing the
true aims of the experiment.
fMRI Acquisition
Scanning was performed at the IRCCS San Camillo using a 1.5T
Phillips AchievaMRI scanner operated with a Sense eight channel
head coil. The experiment was divided into three functional runs,
with time to rest between runs. Functional scans were acquired
by using manufacturers standard single shot EPI sequence
[TR = 2060 ms, echo time (TE) = 45 ms, ﬂip angle = 90◦, 25 slices,
slice thickness = 5 mm, no gap, matrix size 80 × 80, voxel size
2.88 × 2.88 × 5 mm, FOV = 230 × 230 mm]. At the start of the
scanning each participants’ ﬁeldmap was acquired (T1 weighted
fast ﬁeld echo sequence, TE long = 7.6 ms, TE short 4.9 ms,
slice thickness 5 mm, matrix size 72 × 60, no gap, voxel size
0.8× 0.8× 5mm). Fieldmaps were used to correct EPI images for
static geometric distortions caused by susceptibility-induced ﬁeld
inhomogeneities and head movement (Andersson et al., 2001;
Hutton et al., 2002). To aid intersubject registration, at the end
of each scanning session, a 3D T1-weighted structural scan was
acquired for each participant (Fast ﬁeld gradient echo sequence,
TR = 7.4 ms, TE = 3.4 ms, 280 slices, slice thickness = 0.6 mm,
matrix 240× 240, voxel size 1.04× 1.06).
fMRI Analysis
Image pre-processing and data analysis were carried out using
Statistical ParametricMapping software inMatlab 2016a (SPM12;
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging at UCL). The
ﬁrst 6 dummy volumes of each run were discarded to allow
for T1 equilibration, and then the EPI images were corrected
for geometric distortions caused by susceptibility-induced ﬁeld
inhomogeneities. Field maps were ﬁrst brain extracted using FSL
BET (Smith, 2002) and then processed for each participant using
the FieldMap toolbox in SPM (Hutton et al., 2004). The EPI
images were then realigned and unwarped (Andersson et al.,
2001). Each participant’s structural image was coregistered to
the mean of the motion-corrected functional images using a 12-
parameter aﬃne transformation, and segmented according to the
default procedure in SPM12 (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). The
spatial normalization parameters resulting from the previous step
were applied to the functional images to allow for intersubject
analysis. Finally, these images were smoothed using a 6 mm full
width at half maximum Gaussian kernel.
For each participant, an event-related general linear model
(GLM) was designed. The GLM consisted of regressors of
interest: the onsets of the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoﬀ matrix
separately for cooperation and defection in each emotion
condition (sympathy, anger and neutral; at the time when
the payoﬀ matrix appeared on the screen until participants
made their choice and pressed the button, on average lasting
1.96 s, SD = 1.22). Motion parameters deﬁned by the
realignment procedure were entered as regressors of no interest,
separately for each run.
Time derivatives were used and runs where either of
the emotion conditions did not have a single defection or
cooperation were removed (eight runs overall). Statistical
parametric maps were generated from contrasts of interest:
[sympathy (defection vs. cooperation) vs. neutral (defection vs.
cooperation)], and [anger (defection vs. cooperation) vs. neutral
(defection vs. cooperation)].
A random-eﬀects group-level analysis using one-sample
t-tests on the contrast images obtained from each contrast of
interest for each participant was used with peak uncorrected
p ≤ 0.005 and extent threshold of k = 20 (multiple testing
was accounted for on cluster level based corrected pFWE of
0.05). This threshold was suggested to be comparable to FWE
corrected thresholds according to Lieberman and Cunningham
(2009), and Lieberman et al. (2009), however, further discussion
by Eklund et al. (2016) shows that clusterwise inferences increase
false positive error.
RESULTS
Behavioral Impact of Emotion on Social
Decision-Making
To investigate the eﬀect of sympathy, anger and neutral emotion
on defection and cooperation rates, a repeatedmeasuresANOVA,
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FIGURE 2 | Defection and cooperation rate as a function of emotion condition (±1SEM).
with independent variable of emotion condition and dependent
variable of defection rate was used. The results are depicted
in Figure 2. A signiﬁcant repeated measures ANOVA [F(2,
36) = 6.97, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.279] with post hoc comparisons
between the emotion conditions showed that the cooperation rate
increased signiﬁcantly from neutral to sympathy [t(19) = 2.79,
p = 0.012, dz = 0.624], and decreased from neutral to anger at a
trend level [t(19) = −2.07, p = 0.052, dz = 0.463]. Cooperation
also increased from anger to sympathy conditions [t(19) = 4.13,
p = 0.001, dz = 0.923]. Within-subject contrast showed a
signiﬁcant linear trend [F(1, 19) = 7.02, p = 0.016, ηp
2 = 0.270].
Further analysis of the reaction times with a repeatedmeasures
ANOVA showed the main eﬀect of emotion as well as the
emotion by choice interaction to be signiﬁcant [F(2,38) = 6.23,
p = 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.247 and F(2,38) = 4.55, p = 0.017,
ηp
2 = 0.193, respectively]. The paired t-tests between the
defection and cooperation choice in each emotion condition
revealed signiﬁcantly quicker RT’s in the sympathy condition
for cooperation than defection, and also signiﬁcantly quicker
RT’s in defection than cooperation in the neutral condition
[t(19) = −2.15, p = 0.045, dz = 0.481 and t(19) = −3.20,
p = 0.005, dz = 0.716, respectively]. Although the reaction time
in the anger condition increased from defection to cooperation
choice, the increase was not signiﬁcant [t(19) = −1.13, p = 0.274,
dz = 0.253; Table 1].
TABLE 1 | Mean response time (seconds) in cooperation and defection choices
(SD) and mean defection rates (SD) as a function of the emotion condition.
Emotion condition
Sympathy Neutral Anger
Defection response time 1.90 (0.17) 1.71 (0.15) 1.57 (0.13)
Cooperation response time 1.60 (0.13) 1.93 (0.18) 1.71 (0.16)
Defection rate 0.44 (0.20) 0.56 (0.20) 0.67 (0.19)
Imaging Results
The behavioral results indicated that anger directed at the
other player increases defection, while sympathy directed at
the other player increases cooperation. To isolate the neural
basis of increased defection responses in the anger condition we
undertook Emotion by Choice interaction analysis, comparing
the BOLD signal change in the various emotion conditions as a
function of defection and cooperation. We present the following
three interaction contrasts (and their reverse) below: (1) [anger
(defection – cooperation) – neutral (defection – cooperation)];
(2) [sympathy (defection – cooperation) – neutral (defection –
cooperation)]; (3) [sympathy (defection – cooperation) – anger
(defection – cooperation)]. The neural activations associated with
the decision making, independent of emotions, are included in
the Supplementary Materials.
Activation Associated With Defection in Anger
Condition
We used the contrast [anger (defection-cooperation) – neutral
(defection-cooperation)] to compare the diﬀerential eﬀects of
Defection and Cooperation in Anger and Neutral conditions.
It showed activation in the bilateral putamen, and the
right posterior cingulate BA 23 (PFWE < 0.05, Table 2
and Figures 3A,C,D).
We reasoned that if this activation is a reﬂection of the
participants’ choice to defect because of anger directed at their
partner, then there should be a signiﬁcant correlation between
percent signal change and cooperation in the anger condition,
but not in the sympathy or neutral conditions. Furthermore, the
subjective rating from the self-report emotion questionnaire for
anger words should correlate with the percent signal change.
In fact, Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient showed a positive
correlation between interaction contrast percentage signal change
in the left putamen and the cooperation rate in the anger
condition cooperation trials (r = 0.45, p = 0.045, respectively;
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TABLE 2 | Regions of increased activation in the contrasts comparing the sympathy, anger and neutral emotion conditions between each other.
Brain region Brodmann area Hemisphare # of voxels peak T MNI coordinates
x (mm) y (mm) z (mm)
Activation associated with defection in anger condition: a(d-c)-n(d-c)
Sub-lobar
Lentiform nucleus, Putamen∗ L 56 3.45 −18 5 −8
Lentiform Nucleus, Putamen∗ R 41 3.36 24 11 −5
Limbic Lobe
Posterior Cingulate∗∗ BA 23 R 58 4.3 3 −37 22
Activation associated with defection in Sympathy condition: s(d-c)-n(d-c)
Limbic Lobe
Uncus, Superior Temporal Pole∗ BA 28 R 321 4.84 27 5 −23
Uncus, Amygdala∗∗ L 108 4.66 −21 −1 −23
Cingulate Gyrus∗ BA 23 R 691 7.33 3 −28 34
Activation associated with defection in anger vs. sympathy condition: a(d-c)-s(d-c)
Sub-lobar
Lenntiform Nucleus, Putamen∗∗ L 27 2.94 −18 5 −8
Activation associated with defection in sympathy vs. anger condition: s(d-c)-a(d-c)
Frontal Lobe
Medial Frontal Gyrus∗∗ BA 10 L 15 −4.05 −9 56 −8
∗Cluster – level PFWE ≤ 0.05.
∗∗Cluster – level Puncorrected ≤ 0.05.
Figure 3B). Furthermore, anger emotion strength as measured
with the self-report emotion questionnaire negatively correlated
with percent signal change in the left putamen (r = −0.50,
p = 0.047). The correlation between anger emotion word ratings
and the behavioral cooperation was negative but not signiﬁcant
(r =−0.30, p = 0.207).
Finally, there was no signiﬁcant correlation between
defection/cooperation and interaction contrast percent signal
change in the left putamen in the neutral condition (r = −0.08,
p = 0.751). Correlations between cooperation/defection in the
anger condition and percent signal change in the left cingulate
gyrus (BA 23), as well as between the cooperation/defection in
the neutral condition and the percent signal change in the neutral
condition in the left putamen, and the left posterior cingulate
gyrus (BA 23) were not signiﬁcant (r < 0.25, p > 0.288).
The reverse contrast [neutral (defection-cooperation) – anger
(defection-cooperation)] did not show any signiﬁcant activations.
Sympathy and Neutral Interaction With Defection and
Cooperation Choice
The sympathy condition results in increased levels of
cooperation. To isolate the neural basis of increased cooperation
(decreased defection) in the sympathy condition we utilized
the following contrast: [sympathy (defection – cooperation) –
neutral (defection - cooperation)]. The contrast revealed
activation in the right superior temporal pole (BA 28) (cluster
level PFWE < 0.05), and activation in the left amygdala (cluster
level Puncorrected < 0.05; Table 2 and Figures 4A,C,D).
Again correlation analyses were performed to test for a
relationship between the cooperation in the sympathy and
neutral emotion conditions in the activated areas. The left
amygdala interaction contrast percent signal change positively
correlated with cooperation in the sympathy condition (r = 0.57,
p = 0.009; Figure 4B). In addition, the increase in the interaction
contrast percent signal change in the left amygdala was positively
correlated with self-report scores for sympathy words (r = 0.46,
p = 0.043). In contrast, the positive correlation between self-
report words and cooperation was not signiﬁcant (r = 0.28,
p = 0.234). Correlations between percent signal change in
the left amygdala and the corresponding decisions were not
signiﬁcant (r ≤ 0.37, p≥ 0.110) in the neutral emotion condition.
The correlation in the right superior temporal pole and the
left putamen with the defection in the sympathy and neutral
conditions were not signiﬁcant (r < 0.33, p > 0.15).
The reverse contrasts [neutral (defection – cooperation) –
sympathy (defection – cooperation)] showed no
signiﬁcant activation.
Sympathy and Anger Interaction With Defection and
Cooperation Choice
Finally, we examined the response by emotion (sympathy
and the anger) interaction, [anger (defection – cooperation) –
sympathy (defection – cooperation)], revealing activation in the
left putamen, cluster level- Puncorrected ≤ 0.05. The reversed
contrast [sympathy (defection-cooperation) – anger (defection-
cooperation)] showed activation in the left medial frontal gyrus
(BA 10) (Cluster level- Puncorrected ≤ 0.05).
The correlation between percent signal change in the left
putamen with cooperation in the anger condition was a trend
(r = 0.44, p = 0.052), while in the defection trials and
in the sympathy condition cooperation and defection trials
correlation was not signiﬁcant (r ≤ −0.36, p ≥ 0.12). The
left middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) activation in the anger and
the sympathy emotion conditions did not correlate with the
defection rate neither in defection nor in cooperation trials
(r ≤−0.38, p ≥ 0.10).
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Bilateral putamen activation overlaid on the MNI single subject template based on the interaction contrast [anger (defection – cooperation) – neutral
(defection-cooperation)]; (B) Correlation between the interaction contrast percent signal change in the left putamen and the cooperation rate in the anger condition
(blue) and correlation between the percent signal change in the left putamen and the strength of anger word rating in the anger condition (orange); (C) Contrast
estimate and 90% Confidence Interval for interaction contrast; (D) Difference in percent signal change between defection and cooperation trials in sympathy, anger
and neutral emotion condition for interaction contrast.
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated the functional neuroanatomy of
cooperation and defection responses in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game under conditions of partner directed sympathy, anger,
or neutral emotions. The outcome of the game was presented
after each run (36 trials with three opponents) and did not
provide information about what the opponents received. The
reputation building was induced prior to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game via the emotion induction task. The behavioral results
conﬁrmed the eﬀectiveness of the manipulation. As expected,
participants’ cooperation rates increased signiﬁcantly from the
neutral to the sympathy condition and decreased from the
neutral to the anger condition (trend level). Consistent with
this, the sympathy condition elicited quicker responses for
cooperation than defection choices, whereas this pattern was
reversed in the anger and neutral conditions. Imaging results
showed (relative) greater activation in the left putamen, in
the anger condition, and in left amygdala, in the sympathy
condition, compared to the neutral condition, in response to
cooperation choices.
Left putamen percent signal change positively correlated
with cooperation rate. Furthermore, self-reported anger emotion
strength was negatively correlated with percent signal change
in this area. These results suggest that relative increase in left
putamen activation corresponds to more cooperative behavior,
and given the negative correlation with self-report anger
words strength, the putamen activation may be important for
overcoming the desire to retaliate.
Previous studies have documented the role of striatum,
and in particular, left putamen, in emotion regulation. In one
study, participants were shown emotionally neutral faces and
asked to engage either in positive emotion reappraisal (think
positively about the face) or negative emotion reappraisal (think
negatively) (Richey et al., 2015). Left putamen activation was
observed during positive reappraisal trials. Furthermore, not only
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Left amygdala activation overlaid on the MNI single subject template based on the interaction contrast [sympathy (defection – cooperation) – neutral
(defection-cooperation)]; (B) Correlation between the interaction contrast percent signal change in the left amygdala and the cooperation rate in the sympathy
condition (blue), and correlation between the percent signal change in the left putamen and the strength of sympathy word rating in the sympathy condition (orange);
(C) Contrast estimate and 90% Confidence Interval for interaction contrast; (D) Difference in percent signal change between defection and cooperation trials in
sympathy, anger and neutral emotion condition for interaction contrast.
reappraisal, but also emotion suppression elicits activation in the
left (and also right) putamen. Vanderhasselt et al. (2013) asked
participants to view negative and high arousing images and either
suppress the emotion or engage in negative emotion reappraisal.
Negative emotion suppression, but not reappraisal, showed
increased bilateral putamen activation. This is consistent with our
suggestion that the putamen activation in the anger condition
may be linked to overcoming the emotion and cooperating
despite the anger directed at the partner.
The contrast sympathy (defection – cooperation) – neutral
(defection – cooperation) showed activation in the left amygdala.
This activation was positively correlated with both cooperation
rates and self-reported sympathy emotion ratings: higher
amygdala activation related to higher cooperation rates and
higher scores on self-report sympathy emotion strength. These
ﬁndings suggest that relative activation of the amygdala in
the sympathy condition corresponds to increased cooperating
responses and the use of more sympathy words to describe
the participant. The ﬁnding is consistent with past studies.
In the Singer et al. (2004) study, a cooperative opponent in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma triggered sympathetic responses from
the participants (as revealed by the post-trial questionnaire).
Furthermore, intentional decision to cooperate by the opponent
in this study was associated with increased amygdala activation;
the left amygdala was activated when participants were presented
with a photo of an intentional cooperator (person who decided
to cooperate themselves instead of being assigned this decision
by a computer). In a study investigating incidental fear during
the Trust Game with social (with a human opponent) and non-
social (decisions generated by computer) trials, results showed
that a strong unexpected electrical shock (Threat of Shock,
ToS) can reduce trust transfer rates in both social and non-
social conditions (Engelmann et al., 2019). Furthermore, in the
absence of ToS, a signiﬁcant connectivity was observed between
the temporo parietal junction (TPJ) and amygdala during
social trust trials, but this connectivity was disrupted by the
introduction of ToS. The authors suggest that the TPJ-amygdala
connectivity present when there are no aversive emotional stimuli
reﬂects information pre-processing occurring both cognitively
(i.e., mentalizing, TPJ) and emotionally (trustworthiness of the
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opponent assessment, amygdala). However, once threatening
stimuli are introduced, this connectivity is broken: the amygdala
shows suppression and therefore breaks its communication with
the TPJ, reducing one’s ability to mentalize. This suggests that
increased amygdala activity indicates not only of emotional
stimuli preprocessing, but also shows mentalizing processes.
In another study, participants making altruistic decisions
(cooperation) as opposed to selﬁsh decisions (defection) also
showed amygdala activation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019). Increased amygdala
activation might have been the result of participants not
expecting their cooperation to be reciprocated: opponent’s
unreciprocated cooperation toward participants’ resulted in
increased activation of participants left amygdala (Rilling et al.,
2008). Another explanation might come from the research
exploring hippocampus and amygdala connectivity in episodic
emotional memories (Phelps, 2004). Participants under the
condition of receiving instructed anticipated emotional stimuli
(indication of possible electric shock) showed increased left
amygdala activation. This suggests that episodic memories
can inﬂuence an individual’s emotional reactions in part by
modulating amygdala activation. In the current study, it is
possible that participants had episodic memories about the
sympathy-triggering stimuli and experienced sadness toward the
other. Therefore, they were possibly anticipating to feel guilty if
they would choose defection and this resulted in the choice of
cooperation and showed an increased left amygdala activation
during these choices.
Additionally, the amygdala is part of the human reinforcement
expectancies system which is involved in learning the signs of
distress of others and in this way guiding individuals from
antisocial behavior (Ray et al., 2005; Blair, 2007) and helping
to solve moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004). As anticipatory
emotions can guide individuals from antisocial behavior (Rick
and Loewenstein, 2008), expectation of the guilt arising from
their decision results in higher cooperation rates, which is in line
with the withdrawal emotion function (Engelmann and Hare,
2018). Incidental sadness, which is related to sympathy emotion
in our study, does not show the same reward processing as in the
neutral emotion condition (Harlé et al., 2012). Furthermore, at
the neural level, researchers found that the left ventral striatum
showed stronger activation in the neutral condition (indicating
reward processing) but in the sad condition, this pattern was not
observed. Behaviorally, sad participants had a stronger preference
toward fair oﬀers during social interactions. Therefore, it is
possible to assume that in our sympathy condition, participants
were proposing fairer decisions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
One unexpected ﬁnding was that the decrease in cooperation
rates from neutral to anger was only a trend (Eimontaite et al.,
2013). One possible explanation for the lack of signiﬁcance may
be that participants were medical personnel. Compassion and
empathy are desirable skills in nurses and health care workers
as they need to interpret and understand the feelings of their
patients as well as demonstrate compassion for their condition
(Morse, 1991) in addition to being able to restrain negative
actions, remain calm and in control of their behavior in a
stressful situation (Zhang et al., 2001). Due to these professional
characteristics, the participants might have shown a strong
response toward the partner in the sympathy condition, and may
have been able to control their negative emotions in the anger
condition. However, this requires further exploration.
Furthermore, not having actual reimbursement for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma gamemight make the participant feel like the
interactions are without real consequences and could be criticized
on the grounds of not including choices with real outcomes
and consequences. This could potentially have led to a stronger
cooperation response in the sympathy condition compared to
defection in anger. The results should be explored further within
an environment where participants are reimbursed based on
their decisions. Furthermore, the current study used an extent
k = 20 and peak level p = 0.005 (uncorrected) combination
threshold. This threshold was comparable to the Family Wise
Error-corrected thresholds of Lieberman and Cunningham
(2009), and Lieberman et al. (2009). Further discussion on the
subject by Eklund et al. (2016) considered clusterwise thresholds
to be invalid, and the results of the current study can be
considered, therefore, exploratory. Finally, the small sample size
is a limitation of the current study in terms of correlation results.
Yarkoni (2009) argues that small sample size correlations results
in power issues. A solution for this issue is a recommended
increase in sample size (N > 50) (Yarkoni, 2009).
The current study investigated the eﬀect of emotions on
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, with the outcome of
multiple interactions with three opponents revealed only after
36 trials, thus avoiding reputation building through game,
and reputation building was only induced through emotion
manipulation before participants performed on the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. The results show that the eﬀects of partner
directed sympathy and anger emotions on decision-making are
represented by modulation of activation in the left putamen and
the left amygdala. In particular, increased (relative) activation in
left putamen is associated with increased cooperation decisions,
even in the face of partner directed anger. Left amygdala
activation increased (relatively) in response to increased
number of cooperation responses in the partner sympathy
directed condition. In addition, reaction times increased for
decisions where participants went against their emotional
impulse, providing further support, showing the conﬂict between
emotional and rational. These results are important as they
provide further evidence for the role of the left putamen and
left amygdala in social exchange decision-making under the
inﬂuence of partner directed emotion, yet without reputation
building eﬀects.
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